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The Italian Experience of the Commons 
Right to the city, private property  
and fundamental rights 
 
ANTONIO VERCELLONE 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In Italy, the discussion on the commons is characterised by certain particular elements 
with respect to its manifestation in the international debate1. While internationally – 
especially in the Anglo-American world – the issue of the commons has been tackled 
through the lens of economic theory2, in the Italian context it is within the law (and 
private law primarily) that the discourse on the commons has found its breeding 
ground, in a constant and fruitful dialogue between legal scholarship and political 
battles emerging from the bottom-up. 
The Italian approach to the theory of the commons deserves attention because it 
undermines the traditional perspective, according to which the notion of commons can 
be inferred from the intrinsic characteristics of a good: indeed, according to the Italian 
perspective, being a “commons” does not amount to an ontological characteristic of 
the good. This qualification comes, rather, ex-post, as a result of a triangular political 
relationship that sees on one side the good itself, on another a community of people 
 
1 For an introduction to the theory of the commons in Italy see: U. MATTEI, Protecting the Commons: Water, Culture and Nature: 
The Commons Movement in the Italian Struggle against Neoliberal Governance, in The South Atlantic Quarterly, 3, 2013, p. 367. 
2 It is a debate which finds its roots in G. HARDIN, The Tragedy of the Commons, in Science, 1962, p. 1243, the perspective 
of which has been overturned by E. Ostrom (cf. E. OSTROM, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institution for Collective 
Actions, Cambridge, 1990). For an introduction to this debate see O. DE SCHUTTER and B. RAJAGOPAL, Property from Below: 
An Introduction to the Debate, in O. DE SCHUTTER and B. RAJAGOPAL (ed.), Property Rights from Below: Commodification of Land 
and the Counter-Movement, Routledge, Abingdon-on-Thames, 2019.  
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and, on a third side, the fundamental rights that the good is able to satisfy (and the 
community demands).  
The perspective is thus overturned: are not the intrinsic characteristics of a certain good 
that demand it to be governed as a commons. It is rather the model of governance 
adopted for its management which makes it so. In other words, we are dealing with the 
idea of an opposite path, which, overcoming the logical priority of goods over regimes, 
dogmatically assumed by the Western legal and economic traditions, focuses first of all 
on regimes and on how they qualify the good. 
Such an approach, although often accused of giving rise to an excessively vague and 
not always clear category (that of the commons), has nevertheless had the merit of 
offering important theoretical tools, capable of setting up a serious critical reflection on 
some traditional legal categories. 
 
 
2. The category of the commons in Italy: legal doctrine, case-law and political 
battles 
2.1. The law proposal issued by the “Rodotà Commission” 
The starting point for the debate on the commons, in Italy, can be traced back to the 
work of a ministerial commission appointed by the then Minister of Justice, in June 
2007. The Commission was charged with drafting a reform of the part of the Italian 
civil code dedicated to goods (beni).  
The commission, chaired by Stefano Rodotà – a popular jurist who spent his life 
combining legal scholarship with a strong political commitment – was the culmination 
of something which took place previously, which must therefore be given account of. 
A few years earlier, at the Accademia dei Lincei, one of the most prestigious scientific 
institution in the country, a group of scholars had taken stock of the state of Italian 
public assets and of the privatization processes that had affected them3. 
 
3 See U. MATTEI et E. REVIGLIO, S. RODOTÀ (eds.), I beni pubblici. Dal governo democratico dell’economia alla riforma del codice 
civile, Roma, 2010. 
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The research revealed how, in the previous years, the state had carried out a 
tremendous divestment of public assets and services, for a total value of more than 150 
billion euros. 
This privatization process was giving rise to an alarming phenomenon. On the one 
hand, fundamental services were being increasingly entrusted to the private sector and 
subjected to the dynamics of profit, all this usually resulting in both a great deterioration 
in the quality of the service provided and an unjustified rise in prices (this was the case, 
for example, with the water supply, which will be discussed shortly). On the other hand, 
entire real estate holdings, previously accessible to all, were privatized and the 
community was denied access to them (think, in this case, of the many historic buildings 
used as museums or for community services, and sold to private investors to build 
apartments or luxury hotels). 
All this led to a critical reflection on the relationship between private property and 
public intervention as set forth by the civil code. Under this perspective, indeed, the 
code was accused of being somehow anachronistic. 
In fact, while the discipline governing the de-privatisation (or nationalisation) of private 
property ensures the owner a great level of protection (just think of the guarantees that, 
in Italy as well as in the rest of the western legal tradition, surround the doctrine of 
eminent domain), no symmetric rules exist with respect to the opposite process, i.e. the 
privatisation of public assets.  
This historical legacy, which made sense at the time of the development of modern 
constitutionalism and the construction of current private law, seems today to be 
obsolete4. 
While at the end of the nineteenth century it was the landowner who, in order to be 
guaranteed his freedom, had to be protected from a Leviathan State that ran the risk 
of becoming excessively powerful and intrusive, in the current structure it is rather the 
"collective", contingently embodied by an increasingly weakened state, that has to be 
 
4 It must be highlighted that, in the Italian debate on the commons, a great role was played by legal historians and, 
especially, by the studies carried out by Paolo Grossi. See: P. GROSSI, Un altro modo di possedere: l’emersione di forme alternative 
alla proprietà nella coscienza giuridica post-unitaria, Milan, 1977. 
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defended from a private sector that no longer corresponds to the paradigm of the 
small/medium landowner, but rather to those "new forms of ownership"5  typical of 
financial capitalism.  
In other words, while at the origin of legal modernity the protection of the owner from 
the state responded to the need to allow the maximum extractive exploitation of 
resources (mostly agricultural) through institutions able to foster the transformation of 
an excess of commons into capital; today the opposite problem arises. The current 
ecological and economic crisis calls in fact for a protection of the commons in a 
situation in which the scarcity of common goods pairs with an overabundance of 
capital. 
Although the members of the Rodotà Commission were aware that a reform of the 
Civil Code would not in itself be sufficient to bring about such a reversal, still, the theory 
of ownership is the lintel of the structure under discussion and, therefore, in a reformist 
perspective, was considered as being a good starting point. 
Moving on from these reflections, the proposal drawn up by the Commission envisaged 
overcoming the distinction, which the Italian civil code borrowed from the Code 
Napoléon, between demanio (those public goods subjected to a lien of inalienability) and 
disposable public goods (i.e. those goods the state can sell without any specific 
restriction). The category of demanio was indeed considered insufficient to protect 
fundamental public goods from privatization: in fact, the lien of inalienability could 
(and still can) be easily dismissed through a very simple procedure (sdemanializzazione), 
which allows the removal of an asset from demanio turning it into a disposable alienable 
good, all this through the simple adoption of a decree. 
The proposal enacted by the Commission therefore provided for a new taxonomy, 
which, in the first place, would make it more difficult to privatize fundamental public 
goods. 
However, the most important novelty of the proposal, and what is most relevant here, 
was the provision of the new category of the commons (beni comuni). These were defined 
 
5 Cf. U. MATTEI, Proprietà (nuove forme di), Enciclopedia del diritto, Annali, 2012. 
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as goods instrumental to the enjoyment of fundamental rights and the autonomous 
development of the person, the use of which is to be protected for future generations. 
The proposal provided for a list of them, but one that was purely illustrative: natural 
resources, such as rivers, streams, lakes and other waters, and air; parks, forests and 
wooded areas; high-altitude mountain areas, glaciers and perpetual snows; stretches of 
coastline declared an environmental reserve; protected wildlife and flora; other 
protected landscape areas; cultural heritage; archaeological heritage; and so on. In 
other words, it was about assets that are closely linked to fundamental human rights, 
and to which, therefore, the proposal was due to ensure access for all, even in a 
diachronic key, in accordance with the principle of intergenerational justice. 
Under a theoretical perspective, the main characteristic of the new category, as 
developed by the Rodotà Commission, was the breaking of the link between 
fundamental rights, collective needs and necessary public ownership of the good. 
In fact, in the proposal, a reservation of public ownership was envisaged only for those 
goods which satisfy the fundamental interests of the state (“necessary public goods”), 
either because they are strictly connected to the exercise of public sovereignty (military 
structures, strategically important roadways, main railway networks, etc.) or because 
they are functional to public welfare (“social goods”: e.g. hospitals, educational 
institutions, etc.). 
The commons, instead, did not belong to these two categories of goods. 
For the commons, a principle of “indifference to the formal title of ownership” applied.  
The commons were described as resources of shared ownership, which may belong 
either to public or private entities. In both cases, they had to be subjected to a model 
of governance able to guarantee their collective use, according to criteria of ecological 
sustainability and intergenerational justice. Thus, what really mattered, in the new 
category, was not the qualification (public or private) of the owner, but rather the way 
the goods had to be managed. 
Due to the fall of the government that had appointed the reform commission, the law 
proposal, although completed, was never examined by Parliament. 
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Nevertheless, the proposal, and especially the new category of the commons, had a 
significant impact on Italian law. Although it did not succeed in changing the provisions 
of the Civil Code, the elaboration carried out by the commission had the power to filter 
through the system by other legal formants: doctrine, case law and praxis (political and 
administrative). 
 
2.2 The referendum on water distribution and the commons as a legal concept6 
Since 2010, several political and social conflicts have been conducted under the banner 
of the commons, which are very different from each other, but whose common key 
feature lies in the idea of countering concentrations of power and processes of 
exclusion, with specific reference to assets or services functional to the fulfilment of 
fundamental rights of communities and/or to their social and territorial cohesion. 
The forerunner of these conflicts was, without a doubt, the one that, in 2011, led 
millions of Italians to repeal, making use of the institution of the referendum provided 
for in Article 75 of the Italian Constitution, a regulation that, at the time, had just been 
introduced and that would have led to the privatization of the water service7.  
In particular, in 2009, a decree law passed by the Government and converted by 
Parliament provided that, by a certain date, municipalities should put the water 
distribution service out to tender, in favour of entrepreneurs set up in the form of for 
profit corporations8. There was also provision for the possibility of setting up public-
private equity joint ventures, but even in this case the private partner would have to be 
selected from for-profit investors. 
The plan was therefore clear: the water service would be subjected, in its entirety, to 
market dynamics and its direct management by the public would become a marginal 
hypothesis. 
Against this law, a common front was formed that saw movements for the defence of 
public water, associations involved in the third sector, environmental organisations, 
 
6 M.R. MARELLA, The commons as a legal concept, in Law and Critique, 2016, p. 62. 
7 On the Italian legal discipline of water distribution see A. QUARTA, U. MATTEI,  L’acqua e il suo diritto, Rome, 2014. 
8 Article 23 of the Decree Law no. 135 dated 25 September 2009, converted, with amendments, into Law no. 166 dated 
20 November 2009.  
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certain political parties and part of the legal academia as allies together (many of the 
jurists who had been part of the Rodotà Commission were, in 2011, part of the drafters 
of the queries of the referendum held on 12 and 13 June of the same year).  
The success of the referendum that resulted from this mobilization (overcoming the 
structural quorum, with twenty-seven million voters and a prevalence of "yes" votes, 
equal to 97% of the voters) inaugurated the great diffusion of the concept of the 
commons, a concept that, from there onwards, would be used in many disputes 
concerning the defence of environmental resources, cultural heritage, urban real estate, 
etc. against their privatization or their abandonment by the state (or by other public 
bodies). 
The effect of this phase of mobilization, and the consequent spread of the concept of 
the commons, was twofold. 
First of all, the notion of “beni comuni”, which had failed to make its way into the system 
through the main door (i.e. the door of legislative reform), began to penetrate it by 
other means. 
The theoretical formulation underlying the draft law proposed by the Rodotà 
Commission is found, in fact, in an important decision of the Corte di Cassazione (the 
Italian Supreme Court), which recognizes the notion of the commons as intrinsic to the 
Italian legal system and as a category directly descending from an interpretation of 
statutory law in the light of the constitution9. 
In this judgment, which established the ownership of the fishing valleys of the Venetian 
Lagoon, the Court upheld that from the provisions of the Constitution, and from their 
direct applicability, derives "the principle of the protection of the human personality 
and its proper conduct within the welfare state, including within the ‘landscape’, with 
specific reference not only to those goods formally part of the demanio or attributed to 
public ownership, but also with regard to those goods which, independently of a prior 
identification by the legislator, by their intrinsic nature or finalization, are […] functional to the pursuit 
and fulfilment of the interests of the community [...].”  
 
9 Corte di Cassazione, Judgement n. 3811/2011 
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It follows, according to the Court, that “where an immovable property, regardless of the owner, 
is, due to its intrinsic connotations, especially those of an environmental and landscape nature, intended 
for the realization of the welfare state as outlined above, this property is to be considered, beyond the 
now outdated perspective of Roman dominium and code-related ownership, ‘commons’, that is, 
regardless of the title of ownership, instrumentally linked to the realization of the interests of all citizens". 
The notion of beni comuni, in Italy, did not only impact on case law, but also on the 
theoretical elaboration of the legal doctrine. It began, in fact, to be widely discussed by 
scholars, and, particularly, by private law scholars10. 
The initial problem that had to be posed was linked to the need to bring back to a 
systematically coherent and in some way unitary theory instances that, in practice, 
described very different situations. 
The question, in other words, was that of identifying a sufficiently precise notion of beni 
comuni in the face of the extremely wide use that the lemma was beginning to take on 
in practice, a use that was an extension of the meaning that the Rodotà Commission 
had adopted, which, after all, had had mainly scarce natural resources (water, air, etc.) 
in mind. The doctrine investigated what the qualifying element of such assets was and, 
therefore, which assets could be subsumed within the notion of common goods. 
Part of the legal scholarship, assimilating the various declensions that the term “beni 
comuni” began to assume in practice, offered a simple taxonomy that put the common 
elements of these heterogeneous uses in order, identifying material commons (water, 
natural resources linked to the environment and to the historical and artistic-cultural 
heritage of the country, etc.) and immaterial ones (intellectual creations, knowledge and 
popular traditions etc). According to this perspective11, those institutions providing 
services that are the object of social rights (health and university) as well as the urban 
space, meaning not only the urban territory to be protected with respect to the 
processes of cementing but also the cultural specificities of neighbourhoods put at risk 
 
10 Within Italian legal scholarship, see: U. MATTEI, Beni comuni. Un manifesto, Bari, 2011; M.R. MARELLA (eds.), Oltre il 
pubblico e il privato. Per un diritto dei beni comuni, Milan, 2012; S. RODOTÀ, Il terribile diritto. Studi sulla proprietà e i beni comuni, 
Bologna, 2013. In English: M.R. MARELLA, The Commons as a Legal Concept, cit.; U. MATTEI, F. CAPRA, The Ecology of Law. 
Towards a Legal System in Tune with Nature and Community, Oakland, 2015. 
11 M.R. MARELLA, Introduzione, in M.R. MARELLA (eds.), Oltre il pubblico e il privato, op. cit., p. 9. 
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by gentrification, also belong to the category of the commons. Lastly, the taxonomy 
envisaged the idea of "work", "information" and "democracy", thus including within 
the notion of “beni comuni” those political and economic relations endowed with 
constitutional protection. 
Although it is true that a taxonomy undoubtedly facilitates the discussion, it is also true 
that, when it comes to the commons, the risk is coming up with categories which may 
seem too vast and, thus, somehow fuzzy. 
A further passage was therefore attempted.  
This is where the second important consequence of the broadening of the concept of 
“beni comuni”, we referred to earlier, comes in. 
If, in fact, in a first phase, the conflicts about the commons contingently coincided with 
the idea of contrasting the privatization of assets and collective resources so that their 
public ownership would be maintained (think, in this sense, of the conflict about water), 
in this second phase, what is, instead, more valorised is the most innovative element of 
the notion of “beni comuni” developed by the Rodotà Commission (an element which 
has also been emphasized by the Corte di Cassazione). It is a principle that we have 
summarized with the expression "indifference to the formal title of ownership" and, 
that is, the idea that the commons depict a terrain that lies beyond the public and the 
private, since what qualifies them is not certain physical characteristics which they 
possess but, rather, the regime of governance to which they are subject, by virtue of 
political processes that led to their collectivization and that can be qualified as 
“constituent”. 
Put in other words, what qualifies a commons is not so much its title of ownership 
(which can be either public or private), but rather the fact that it has been declared by 
a given community of reference as a good fundamental to the satisfaction of its rights 
and social cohesion and that, as a result of this, has been subjected to a model of 
governance with specific characteristics. These characteristics can be summarized as 
follows: i) perpetual exclusion of the asset from the market; ii) submission of the good 
to a system of democratic and participatory stewardship; iii) the respect of the principle 
of intergenerational justice; iv) a set of rules where access, instead of exclusion, becomes 
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the ordering category. In other words, it is the model of governance around which the 
use of the good is structured that qualifies the commons, regardless of both, the intrinsic 
characteristics of the asset and the branch of law (public or private) that is used to build 
it.  
It is precisely this perspective that has been adopted by the most recent theoretical 
perspectives12. Its valorisation has, indeed, led to a third phase of reflection on the 
commons.  
In such a phase the notion of “beni comuni” is increasingly used as a hermeneutical device 
to investigate, in a counter-hegemonic key, existing law, in order to identify 
interpretative solutions enabling the construction of legal regimes which can oppose to 
the extractive nature of the traditional structure of private property a model of 
ownership which can be qualified as generative and ecological. 
 
3. Urban common 
3.1.  At the heart of the legal conceptualization of urban governance: the 
public/private divide  
The urban space is perhaps the area within which both the practice and theory of the 
commons have developed most consistently13. 
In this context, the commons represent the answer, from the bottom up, to the failure 
of the traditional structure of governance of cities, based on the dichotomy between 
private property and public intervention. 
From modernity onwards, private property has been the default structure to which 
urban lands have been subjected.  
However, private property, conceived and designed around the paradigm of 
agricultural land, is incompatible with an interconnected fabric such as that of cities 
and, above all, with those needs that, in cities, must be satisfied. These needs can be 
effectively summarized by the notion of “right to the city”, understood in its dual 
 
12 In this perspective see the essays in A. QUARTA and M. SPANÒ (eds.), Beni comuni 2.0. Controegemonia, nuove istituzioni, 
Milan, 2016; also see: M.R. MARELLA, The Commons as a Legal Concept, op. cit. 
13 See U. MATTEI, A.  QUARTA, Right to the City or Urban Commoning?, in The Italian Law Journal, 2/1, 2015, p. 304. 
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meaning of right to housing and right to habitat, i.e. the collective right to live in a 
healthy, serviced and economically, ecologically, artistically and culturally adequate 
environment14. 
Private property (at least in its traditional structure) is antithetical to these needs. Such 
needs call for ownership regimes based on access and on the distribution of the utility 
obtainable from the good, in accordance with the satisfaction of fundamental rights. 
On the contrary, the default structure of private property is preordained to encourage 
the extraction of the maximum value from a land, allocating all its benefits to the 
owner, according to the well-known perspective of alignment between costs, benefits 
and incentives outlined by the Coase theorem15. 
For this reason, private property, as the founding structure of the market, cannot 
provide an answer to the needs underlying the right to the city. 
This is evident with regards to the right to housing. Given that the market only 
acknowledges demands, and not needs, an urban governance based on private property 
excludes anyone not having the necessary purchasing power from having a home. 
Similar problems also arise with reference to the right to habitat: since the dynamics of 
private property select, among the various possible uses of a good, only the most 
profitable ones, a city delegated exclusively to market forces would end up with an 
overabundance of residential and commercial buildings and the with a lack of green 
areas and assets intended for services and public spaces. Obviously, the latter do not 
guarantee a profit since they amount to non-rival and non-exclusive goods: this is the 
well-known problem of public goods, one of the hypothesis of market failure envisaged 
by neoclassical economics.  
Similarly, urban regeneration plans fully entrusted to the market would limit the 
redevelopment only to sufficiently profitable areas (for example historic centres), 
relegating to abandonment those areas that conceal a low or negative rent-gap (for 
 
14 See D. HARVEY, Rebel Cities: from the Right to the City to Urban Revolution, London, 2012; by the same author see: The Right 
to the City, in 53, New Left Review, 2008, p. 5; also see H. LEFEBVRE, Le droit à la ville, Paris, 1968; on the relationship 
between the right to the city and urban commons see S. FOSTER, Urban Commons, Property and the Right to the City, in O. DE 
SCHUTTER e B. RAJAGOPAL (eds.), Property Rights from Below, op. cit. 
15 R. COASE, The Problem of Social Costs, in The Journal of Law and Economics, 1960.  
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example former industrial suburbs). Similarly, they  would lead to the subjection of the 
area to its most profitable uses (e.g. hotels, apartments and luxury shops, etc.) and, 
therefore, to its substantial privatisation and to the urban displacement of the weakest 
part of the resident population. 
Precisely to avoid these imbalances, the dogmatic model on which urban governance 
is based in western legal systems provides that the drive of private ownership (i.e. the 
market) is limited or obviated by public intervention. It is in this sense that institutions 
such as the land use plan, public-private tools for urban regeneration, the control of the 
market of rents and, finally, the various public systems of access to housing for 
disadvantaged groups must be read. 
However, this dual system (private ownership/public control) brings about structural 
imbalances16. These are the consequence of the fact that such a system, instead of being 
based on directly functionalized ownership regimes aimed at the satisfaction of 
fundamental rights, finds its foundation in a model of ownership (i.e. private property) 
that is completely antithetical to the needs arising from cities. Obviously, from the 
perspective of the public, having to constantly fix dysfunctions caused by private 
property involves an enormous expenditure of resources. Precisely for this reason, the 
shortfalls of the paradigm under examination emerge with particular force in periods 
of economic crisis and of big cutbacks in public funds. 
In these cases, not only is the public no longer able to stem private property due to lack 
of resources, but, above all, it ends up pandering to its drive, politically and legally 
building the conditions for the private accumulation of land rent. 
A good example of that are the legal mechanisms at the cornerstone of urban 
regeneration.  
As is well known, the post-industrial city – a key feature of the urbanistic paradigm of 
western cities since the 1980s and 1990s – brings with it important reconversion needs. 
Disused industrial spaces, urban voids, entire districts (think of the so-called dormitory 
districts designed for the working class) that need to find a new purpose. 
 
16 See A. VERCELLONE, Il Community Land Trust. Autonomia privata, conformazione della proprietà, distribuzione della rendita urbana, 
Milan, 2020, pp. 9-81. 
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In a context of very limited public resources, local authorities, which certainly cannot 
leave entire areas of cities abandoned, have very limited options if they move within 
the traditional framework set on the private ownership/public intervention dichotomy. 
In particular, the choice is between not redeveloping (due to lack of resources) or 
redeveloping by attracting private capital. However, this can only be done by allowing 
the private investors to extract the maximum land rent from the area17, either by 
enabling the privatization of entire portions of the city, or by subjecting real estates 
assigned to collective use to more profitable uses, or by selecting only the most relevant 
areas, such as the ones which have a greater historical value, for redevelopment. Any 
barrier that the public wants to put to these variables requires this latter to refund the 
private investor of the losses it will have to face. This may take the form of either the 
injection of a portion of public capital, usually justified as leverage to raise private funds, 
or, as is more often the case, by authorizing the investor to construct new volumes, in 
addition to urban planning standards, and thus to make a profit by placing the new 
areas on the market. 
We are dealing, in other words, with mechanisms which promote gentrification and 
overbuilding of entire areas of the city. 
This is the rationale at the cornerstone of most urban regeneration disciplines in force 
in EU Member States. 
In other words, in times of cutbacks in public resources, the dualism of private 
ownership/public intervention strongly shows its limitations, since the public cannot 
stand up to market pressures by guaranteeing services and collective spaces. 
European cities (but the same could, with the necessary adaptations, be transposed to 
other contexts) are the mirror of these shortfalls. As recent data certifies, they are 
characterized by a clear contrast between strongly gentrified areas and ghetto quarters, 
to which the disadvantaged sections of the population are relegated, in a context that 
 
17 See, on this point, the theoretical framework elaborated by N. Smith, and known as “theory of rent gap”: N. SMITH, 
Uneven Development. Nature, Capital and the Production of Space, Athens, 1984; ID. The New Urban Frontier. Gentrification and the 
Revanchist City, London, 1996; ID. New Globalism, New Urbanism: Gentrification as Global Urban Strategy, in Antipode, 3, 2002, 
pp. 427-450. 
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sees the proliferation of urban voids, as well as the growing increase in inequality, both 
within the city and between the city and the surrounding suburbs. 
 
3.2.  Urban commons as a bottom-up solution to the shortfalls of the 
public/private divide 
It is within this context that urban commons are placed18. This term refers to a series 
of experiences in which groups of active citizens organize themselves from the bottom 
up to take direct care of urban immovable goods, often urban voids or abandoned 
spaces, with the aim of managing and administering them through open and 
participatory governance mechanisms. In these experiences, the so-called commoning 
phase takes on fundamental importance. This is the phase in which a group of people 
demands the care, direct and participatory management of a given asset, emphasising 
its importance for the satisfaction of the rights of the community or for its social 
cohesion, and calls for it to be administered according to the principle of access19.  
In this way, the group of citizens becomes the community of reference, and the good a 
bene commune.  
The main characteristics of these experiences can be summarized as follows: a) the 
presence of a good in need of care and regeneration because it is in a state of 
abandonment or to which, for other reasons, access by the community is denied (the 
asset is often in public ownership but this is not always the case); b) the presence of a 
community of citizens who decide to take care of it, adopting democratic and 
participatory procedures; c) the management of the good in order to offer services of a 
collective nature, directly related to the social cohesion of a given community or to the 
satisfaction of fundamental rights. 
Some examples could be of help.  
Think of an historical theatre owned by a municipality, in need of maintenance and 
therefore closed for years, which the public owner decides to sell to private investors to 
 
18 See S. FOSTER et C. IAIONE The City as a Commons, in Yale Law and Policy Review, 2, 34, 2016, p. 282. 
19 See D. BOLLIER and S. HELFRICH, Overture, in D. BOLLIER and S. HELFRICH (eds.), Patterns of Commoning, Amherst, 2015, 
p. 18. 
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build a shopping mall, and then occupied by artists and citizens who, opposing 
privatization, reactivate a theatre season and organize the afternoon use of the space 
for courses, political meetings and food kitchens for people in need. Another example 
is the case of the abandoned industrial property in which various actors involved in the 
housing crisis sector decide, in agreement with the local authorities and the private 
owner, to organize a community land trust and thus to organize the use of the property 
according to a participatory, democratic and sustainable model of social housing and 
to allocate it, therefore, to the satisfaction of the right to housing. A last example could 
be the one of the public garden that has been closed for years due to lack of funds for 
its maintenance and the neighbourhood committee that organizes itself from the 
bottom up to prune its plants, manage its cleaning and allocate part of it to urban 
vegetable gardens according to rules of access, use and organization shared and 
collectively drawn up during various meetings and assemblies. 
Although these occurrences, especially in their early stages, are largely based on 
informal dynamics, law is central to them. 
It is clear, in fact, that the self-organization of a community with regards to the use and 
management of an asset is, in the first place, an institutional matter. 
The first problem, from this point of view, concerns the fact that, often, the assets 
subject to care and regeneration are under public ownership. 
Although it is true that, in some cases, the act of taking charge by the community of 
reference expresses a conflict with the public administration (to the point of sometimes 
taking the form of illegal occupations), it is equally true that in many contexts the 
dialectic between the community of reference and the administration has turned from 
conflictual to collaborative and has seen the municipality and the community of 
reference engaged in a path of participatory co-planning on the shared use and 
management of the estate. 
The success of these experiences has changed the political culture of many Italian local 
administrations, which are increasingly willing, especially in recent times, to promote 
regeneration paths based on the direct care of goods by the citizens and to start 
collaborative dialogues with the communities of reference. 
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3.3.  The Italian experience of municipal regulation on urban commons 
In order to provide a legal framework within which to place the administration's actions 
in the context of these experiences, lacking a national legislative framework, many 
Italian municipalities (now more than two hundred) have adopted specific regulations 
on urban commons20. 
These regulations, which each city issues under partially different names (the most 
widespread is regulations "on collaboration between citizens and administrations for 
the care and regeneration of urban commons", along the lines of the Bologna 
regulation, which is the archetype), have specific features and differences between 
them. 
An in-depth analysis of them would, therefore, require a great work of micro-
comparison, which would go well beyond the more modest objectives of this paper. We 
would thus just describe some common basic features of these regulations. 
Firstly, their stated aim is to establish a cooperation (in the forms we will see shortly) 
between the administration and what are called active citizens and/or communities of 
reference. The regulations define the communities of reference (or the active citizens) 
as those individuals or association or social groups, including informal ones, who are 
committed to the care, management and administration of an urban commons.  
The notion of “active citizens” is therefore closely linked to that of urban commons, 
according to a schema whereby the latter is a hermeneutical parameter of integration 
of the former. The regulations, although not always concurring, qualify urban 
commons as assets that citizens and the administration recognize as functional to the 
satisfaction of the fundamental rights of the person, to the individual and collective 
well-being, and to the interests of future generations, which must be administered 
according to the forms and principles provided for by the regulations themselves. These 
 
20 See: R. ALBANESE, E. MICHELAZZO, Manuale di diritto dei beni comuni urbani, Turin, 2020; C. ANGIOLINI, Possibilità e limiti 
dei recenti regolamenti comunali in materia di beni comuni, in A. QUARTA, M. SPANÒ (eds) Beni comuni 2.0., op. cit.; on the Italian 
experience of urban commons see, also, T. DALLA MASSARA, M. BEGHINI (eds.), La città come bene comune, Napoli, 2019. 
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postulate the need for co-management through democratic and participatory models 
of governance, based on access, rather than exclusion.  
From these regulations, it is therefore possible to deduce one of the main legal 
characteristics of the commons: that is, the overcoming of the dichotomy between subject 
and object within the conceptualization of the exercise of the legal prerogatives on a 
good. According to the legal framework set up by the regulations, a community of 
reference can be defined as such because not only does it declare an asset as a commons, 
but also because it subjects it to a model of governance that bear specific characteristics. 
These local disciplines thus translate into a legal text what we have referred to as the 
process of  “commoning”, that is, that dialectical process in which, by virtue of a 
political-institutional relationship between subjects and thing, a community of people 
becomes a community of reference and a thing becomes a commons good.  
At the cornerstone of the regulations is the so-called "collaboration pact" (this, too, is 
called in different ways, depending on the case) 21. This is the agreement signed by the 
public administration and the community of reference in which the shared modalities 
for the management, care and regeneration of the asset are established. The agreement 
is made following a proposal for co-management of the good, which may formally come 
from either the administration or the community of reference. 
Much can be said about collaboration pacts, a very innovative institution that, in Italy, 
is beginning to be discussed both by the administrative and the private legal 
scholarship22.   
We will limit ourselves here to a few brief observations. 
Leaving aside the much debated (and, indeed, very relevant) issue of the legal 
qualification of that pact (which calls for a choice between the administrative act, the 
contract – the latter being an option that seems preferable – and a tertium genus of 
uncertain collocation), what is interesting here is to observe how this institution breaks 
with the top-down dynamics typical of citizen-institution relations in administrative 
law. On the contrary, it promotes a legal relationship of an equal nature, in the wake 
 
21 See A. GIUSTI, La rigenerazione urbana. Temi, questioni e approcci nell’urbanistica di nuova generazione, Naples, 2018.  
22 See R. ALBANESE, Nel prisma dei beni comuni. Contratto e governo del territorio, Turin, 2020. 
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of the principle of horizontal subsidiarity that the Italian Constitution upholds in its 
Article 118.  
In particular, in the collaboration pact, citizens and administrations establish together 
the role that each of them assumes in the shared care of the asset and they regulate the 
aspects related to its participatory stewardship.  
It should be noted that the collaboration pact makes it possible to set up direct 
cooperation between citizens and local authorities without having to resort to open 
public tenders. This because the pact shall be legally qualified as a tool for structuring 
the cooperation between citizens and the administration (and not as a mean by which 
the administration grants a private actor the exclusive and profitable use of a public 
immovable good) 23. In other words, urban commons replace the dynamics of profit 
with that of the value produced by social cooperation: for this reason, they fall outside 
the scope of the regulations on public procurements. 
From this perspective, it is also noteworthy that the pact of collaboration does not 
definitively define the subjects to whom the administration entrusts the care and 
management of the good. In fact, it identifies a community of reference which must 
necessarily equip itself with an internal regulation that allows anyone to become its 
member. In other words, the community of reference, in order to be able to stipulate 
the pact, must structure its internal organization in such a way as to allow anyone to 
participate in the care and management of the good and actively participate to its 
internal decision making processes. This implies that the admission of a new member 
into the community cannot in any way be left to the discretion of one of its organs. It 
may, at most, be subject to the concrete demonstration, by the interested party, of an 
effective interest in the management and care of the asset. For example, in a community 
of reference structured in the forms of an association, an article of the bylaws 
subordinating the admission of new members to the discretionary choice of the board 
of directors shall be considered inconsistent with a pact of collaboration (and, more 
 
23 See E. MICHELAZZO, Riflessioni sui patti di collaborazione in rapporto alla concorrenza, in R. ALBANESE, E. MICHELAZZO, A. 
QUARTA (eds.), Gestire i beni comuni urbani. Modelli e prospettive. Atti del convegno di Torino 27-28 febbraio 2019, Rubbettino, Turin, 
2020. 
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generally, with a model of governance inspired by the principles of the commons). By 
contrast, a clause that admits de plano new members, but that subordinates the exercise 
of the right to vote in the assembly to the participation in a minimum number of 
consecutive meetings or to specific acts of care and management (e.g. participation in 
a specific working group), might well be legitimate. 
In any case, this principle guarantees that anyone who is interested can take part in the 
management and administration of the good and can directly influence the choices 
concerning its stewardship.  
This means that the pact does not constitute a transfer of a public good to the exclusive 
use of a private subject (something which would give rise to a concession and, 
consequently, would require the undertaking of a public tender). The pact of 
collaboration, on the contrary, implements to the maximum the principle of horizontal 
subsidiarity by entrusting the care of the good directly to the community, understood 
in a widespread sense. Consistent with this, and with this new form of "administration", 
the public administration’s duty of impartiality, in this context, is not guaranteed 
upstream (according to the top-down dynamic that oversees the regulation of public 
tenders). In the domain of urban commons it is, rather, assured "downstream", that is, 
through the concrete mechanisms of management and governance that the community 
of reference is given in the exercise of its civic autonomy. 
 
4. Model of governance for the management of urban commons 
4.1.  Overview 
From all that has been discussed so far, one element emerges: the centrality assumed by 
models of  governance in both the theory and practice of  the commons. With models 
of  governance we refer to the concrete ways in which the communities of  reference 
organize the open, participatory and democratic management of  the good. 
This centrality is inherent in the principle that we have defined as "indifference to the 
formal title of  ownership" which predicates, as we have seen, that the commons are 
collocated beyond the public and the private. In order for this formula to take on 
meaning, it can only be understood in the sense that what counts is the property 
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arrangements through which the commons are managed, regardless of  the 
qualification – public or private – of  the owner. 
These models of  governance must then be examined and studied, because otherwise 
the principle of  indifference to the formal title of  ownership, which is at the heart of  
the theory of  commons, becomes an empty word. 
Also in this case, urban commons are the area in which both social experimentation 
and doctrinal reflections appear, at least in Italy, more advanced. 
However, as already partially mentioned, the establishment of  an open and 
participatory model of  governance of  the good is the final aim of  any process of  urban 
commoning, including those which follow the paths traced by municipal regulations on 
the commons, regulations which, not by chance, usually dedicate specific paragraphs 
to the models of  governance. 
Without claiming to be exhaustive, let us therefore look at some of  these models. 
 
4.2. The uso civico (civic usage) 
A first set of  instruments can be built using public law institutions. 
This is the case with uso civico, a model that, in Italy, has enjoyed a remarkable echo 
because it represents the model of  governance of  a very well-known and important 
experience of  urban commoning: the former Asilo Filangieri in Naples.  
It should be pointed out that the uso civico discussed here does not correspond, from a 
technical point of  view, to the uso civico conceived by continental private law, the latter 
being an institution which moves integrally within the domain of  private property, 
allowing a community access to a certain use of  a good according to rules and principles 
of  customary law. 
With this uso civico, the "Neapolitan-style" uso civico shares the idea of  collective access, 
but differs profoundly from a technical-legal perspective.  
In the Italian experience, uso civico is conceived as a tool of  governance of  common 
goods in public ownership and, in particular, municipal ownership24. 
 
24 On uso civico see the essays contained in the third part of the volume edited by R. ALBANESE, E. MICHELAZZO, A. 
QUARTA, Gestire i beni comuni urbani, op. cit. 
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It provides that the community of  reference of  the good builds, autonomously and from 
the bottom up, the rules on the use of  the spaces, on the deliberative and decisional 
procedures, on the organization of  the activities, etc., joining them together in one 
document: the so-called "declaration of  uso civico". 
It is therefore up to the municipality to incorporate the declaration in an administrative 
act (which takes the form of  a deliberation of  the city council). Such a deliberation has 
the dual effect of  giving some form of  legal effect to the declaration and, above all, of  
legitimising the possession of  the good by the community of  reference, a possession 
which takes shape in the forms and ways provided for in the declaration itself. 
The main Italian experience relying on this form of  governance amounts to a best 
practice in the European urban commons landscape. The feeling, however, is that this 
is more the result of  favourable political contingencies rather than the product of  the 
institutional choice made. 
From a more strictly institutional point of  view, in fact, it is our opinion that uso civico 
bears serious limits and shortfalls. 
The most relevant among them is that just as the municipality can grant uso civico, 
acknowledging by its own act the declaration drawn up by the community of  reference, 
the same municipality, as owner of  the property, can at any time, and ad nutum, ignore 
it, by simply adopting an equal and contrary act. From a strictly legal point of  view, 
therefore, uso civico does not protect the good from public power, which may, at its sole 
discretion, decide to withdraw its effects and use the good for other purposes, for 
example by selling it on the market for commercial use. The risk, in other words, is that 
uso civico, granted during a favourable political climate, typically at a time when the 
majority of  the city council welcomes experiences of  urban communing, may be 
revoked at the first change of  political majority.  
In this way, the good is put once more at the mercy of  the contingent political will of  
the pro tempore majority. Uso civico thus ends up by obliterating one of  the cornerstones 
that should oversee a good mechanism for the management of  the commons, namely, 
the structural (rectius: legal) capacity of  the model to withstand the opposing pressures 
that, in the long term, could come from both the state and market. 
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Secondly, uso civico appears to be a scarcely scalable mechanism, given that civil liability 
for any damage related to the use of  the good remains with the municipality. Except in 
special cases where some municipal manager, out of  political passion and civic 
dedication, decides to take responsibility for damages to third parties, it is clear that in 
the ordinary operations of  a public entity it is difficult to expect it to maintain 
responsibility for the use of  the good without, however, being able to exercise any 
control over it. 
 
4.3.  The foundation and the trust 
It is interesting to note how the shortfalls mentioned with reference to uso civico can be 
overcome through the use of  private law institutions. 
The example of  the foundation is paradigmatic25. 
The notion of  foundation is common to most of  the systems belonging to the Western 
legal tradition, where a substantial convergence is found mainly in continental 
jurisdictions. 
The foundation can be defined as the establishment of  assets earmarked for a general 
interest purpose as a legal person. From a technical point of  view, the typical effect of  
the establishment of  a foundation is, therefore, twofold: i) the creation of  a lien of  a 
proprietary nature on one or more assets; ii) the elevation of  the intended assets to an 
independent legal person. 
It is precisely these aspects that make the foundation a particularly useful tool in the 
management of  urban commons. In fact, the foundation can be used to assign, on a 
permanent basis, an immovable property to the collective use registered in the bylaws 
and in the articles of  association, thus protecting it, in the long term, from the extractive 
pressures which might come both from the state and the market. The foundation, in 
most western legal systems (and certainly under Italian law) also bear a certain 
 
25 See A. VERCELLONE, La fondazione, in R. ALBANESE, E. MICHELAZZO, A. QUARTA (eds.), Gestire i beni comuni urbani, op. 
cit. 
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flexibility, a flexibility that allows private autonomy to build participatory and 
democratic governance mechanisms. 
With respect to the first aspect, a pivotal role is to be attributed to the scope set out in 
the bylaws and in the articles of  association, as well as in any further and more precise 
use restrictions provided for by such documents.  
In fact, pursuant to Article 25 of  the Italian Civil Code, any act adopted by the 
foundation's governing bodies in breach of  the bylaws or the articles of  association is 
null and void and, in the case of  a breach of  a use restriction that is clearly stated in 
such documents (which are usually published and registered), such nullity is enforceable 
against third parties.  
The effects of  this rule are extremely relevant for our purposes. Let us take as an 
example a foundation set up to manage, as a commons, an urban property, a good 
which, when the articles of  association of  the foundation are drawn up, is declared to 
be used for theatrical and cultural activities. Imagine, now, that the board of  directors 
of  the foundation resolves, in contravention of  the purpose recorded in the articles of  
association and of  any more precise restrictions of  use included in specific clauses of  
the bylaws, to sell a part of  the real estate holdings to a for profit corporation, to 
establish a luxury shop there. In a case such as this, not only would the resolution of  
the board of  directors be considered invalid, but equally invalid would be the contract 
of  sale entered into with the company, given that the latter would lack the necessary 
power of  attorney (due to the invalidity of  the resolution authorizing the transfer). The 
invalidity of  the contract of  sale would be enforceable against the company, given the 
manifest contrast between its object and the foundation's articles of  association. The 
effect would, of  course, be the retrocession of  the good to the foundation (as well as the 
possible removal of  disloyal directors, especially where this is expressly provided for in 
the articles of  association). 
According to the Italian legal doctrine and case-law, an indefectible element of  the 
foundation is, in fact, precisely the scope (and therefore the usage restrictions) recorded 
in the bylaws and in the articles of  association. The scope is not only unchangeable, 
but also cannot be disposed of  by the bodies of  the entity. This limit must be understood 
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both in its direct meaning (it is not possible to approve an amendment of  the bylaws or 
of  the articles of  association aimed at changing the scope) and indirect (any act or 
resolution adopted in violation of  the scope is null and void). It is, moreover, precisely 
this constraint that, under Italian law, distinguishes the foundation from the association. 
The association is an "organization of  men" who agree to pursue a common purpose. 
Precisely for that, the scope is at the members’ disposal and they can modify it. This is 
not the case with the foundation, which, on the contrary, is usually defined as an 
earmarked good that becomes a legal person. 
The Italian doctrine insisted on this aspect to legitimise the use of  private autonomy in 
the creation of  atypical governance structures, which disregard the model of  
governance provided for in the civil code, which, as far as foundations are concerned, 
provides for a board of  directors as the only organ. 
It has indeed been upheld that if  what qualifies the foundation is the non-modifiability 
of  the scope by the organs of  the institution, only this (and not also a specific structure 
of  governance) is the indefectible element of  the foundation. Therefore, given the 
mandatory nature of  this principle and the necessary presence of  a board of  directors, 
there is nothing in the law which prevents the articles of  association from flanking the 
board of  directors with other bodies such as, for example, an open assembly structured 
according to participatory and democratic mechanisms. 
On this basis, Italy has seen the spread of  foundations with very atypical models of  
governance, which graft into the foundation bodies typical of  other entities, such as an 
assembly. This is a practice which, today, has found detailed recognition in some recent 
legislative reforms26. 
Precisely because of  the flexibility and the ample space that Italian law grants to private 
autonomy in the construction of  the governance of  the foundation, this institution is 
being discussed more and more in Italy as a possible model for the management of  
urban commons. It is not by chance that some municipal regulations on the commons 
(see, for example, the Regulations of  the City of  Turin) include the foundation among 
 
26 D.lgs. 3 luglio 2017, n. 117 (Codice del Terzo Settore). On this reform see E. QUADRI, Il terzo settore tra diritto speciale e 
diritto generale, in Nuova Giurisprudenza Civile Commentata, 5, 2018, pp. 708 ss. 
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the models of  governance on which the community of  reference and the municipality 
can agree upon for the management and care of  an urban property subject to a 
collaboration pact. 
Indeed, it is quite possible to imagine that the community of  reference comes together 
in an assembly, which is characterized by those open and participatory mechanisms 
that ensure that anyone can take part in it and that the latter (considered as the highest 
deliberative instance of  the entity and the holder of  the power of  political direction) 
elects the members of  the board of  directors, depositary of  the classic executive and 
managerial powers. 
But this flexibility also makes it possible for the board of  directors to be structured in 
such a way as to reflect the various stakeholders of  the good and the activities that take 
place in it. And so, to return to our example, there is nothing to prevent a foundation, 
to which a property previously belonging to the municipality has been ceded so that it 
can be used for cultural and theatrical activities, from constituting a board of  directors 
composed partly of  representatives of  the assembly, partly of  representatives of  the city 
council and partly of  representatives of  the local theatre association.  
The foundation therefore contains all the elements necessary to ensure proper 
governance of  an urban commons: i) it allows the creation of  a lien on the good, 
preventing it being subjected to market speculation; ii) it allows such a lien to be 
enforceable erga omnes; iii) it allows the building of  a democratic and participatory model 
of  governance, flexible enough to give representation to all the stakeholders. 
To this we must be add a further, fundamental, element. 
When the foundation is used to manage a good that was originally in public ownership, 
it makes it possible to overcome the main shortfall that is typical of  the models of  
governance of  the commons which rely on public ownership, a shortfall we pointed out 
when discussing the institution of  uso civico. 
And in fact, since the public body assigns ownership of  the good to the foundation, it 
cannot in any way change its intention to administer it according to the criteria related 
to the commons (for example, by deciding to sell it on the market) through a simple 
administrative act. The administration will at most be able to participate in the 
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management of  the good in the forms provided for by the foundation's articles of  
association and bylaws (and thus, for example, exercising its right to be represented in 
the excecutive body) and will, therefore, also be bound by the scope provided for by the 
acts constitutive of  the legal person. 
The only way for the public to regain ownership of  the good is through expropriation. 
In such a case, however, it would be subjected to the burden of  proving the requirement 
of  public interest, and would therefore be required to prove that the use it intends to 
make of  the good is more socially desirable than that envisaged by the foundation's 
bylaws (and activities). 
Similar results to those achievable with the foundation can be accomplished through a 
trust, in an arrangement in which the trustee takes the form of  a non-profit 
organization (e.g. an association) structured according to an open and democratic 
model of  governance. 
It is known that the trust, institution typical of  common law systems27, has, since the 
late 1990s, started to be recognized in many civil law jurisdictions28.  
This also happened in Italy29, where an early prudent position on the part of  the legal 
doctrine and case law was followed by a substantial openness towards the recognition 
of  the institution, and this also following some (albeit timid) interventions by the 
legislator. The praxis has thus not hesitated to make use of  this tool for the purpose of  
organising the participatory administration of  public goods intended for collective 
purposes, as evidenced by the important trials in this sense carried out in the city of  
Bologna30. 
 
 
27 To give a comprehensive account of the literature on the law of trusts would go far beyond the scope of this work. For 
an introduction see J.E. PENNER, The Law of Trusts, 11th ed., Oxford, 2019; for an account of the law of trusts in the US 
see: AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Restatement (Third) of Trusts, 2003; for a theoretical perspective very relevant for the scope 
of this essay see: H. HANSMANN, U. MATTEI, Functions of Trust Law. A Legal and Economic Analysis, in NYU Law Rev., 73, 
2, 1998. 
28 See L. SMITH (eds.), Reimagining the Trust. Trusts in Civil Law, Cambridge, 2012. 
29 On the institution of the trust in the Italian experience see: M. GRAZIADEI, Recognition of Common Law Trusts in Civil Law 
Jurisdictions under the Hague Trusts Convention with Particular regard to the Italian Experience, in L. SMITH (eds.), Re-imagining the 
Trust, cit. p. 29; ID. Trusts in Italian Law, in M. CANTIN CUMIN (eds.), La fiducie face au trust dans le rapports d’affaires, Bruxelles, 
1999, pp. 265; M. LUPOI, Il trust nel diritto civile, in Trattato di diritto civile diretto da Rodolfo Sacco, Milano, 2004. 
30 On this matter see A. TONELLI, Trust e beni pubblici: un nuovo ed efficiente percorso, in R. ALBANESE and E. MICHELAZZO, A. 
QUARTA (eds.), Gestire i beni comuni urbani, op. cit. 
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4.4. The community land trust  
The experiences of  urban commons also point to the very creative and orchestrated 
use of  existing tools of  private law to create new and sophisticated ownership regimes 
capable of  directing the utility obtained from the goods towards the satisfaction of  
fundamental rights. 
In this respect, the American example of  the community land trust (CLT), a model 
invented in the United States in the 1970s, but mostly developed during the years of  
the recent economic crisis, is paradigmatic31. 
In its traditional definition, the CLT is a non-profit organisation, whose aim is to 
promote access to housing for low to medium income people, through the sale of  
property at a price below market value, and to create a participatory governance of  the 
urban space, combining the interests of  the owner with the wider needs of  local 
communities and the territory. The structure of  the CLT is based on three elements: i) 
the dissociation between the title of  ownership of  the land and the title of  ownership 
on the improvements; ii) a strong conformation of  the property rights of  the home-
owner; iii) an open associative model, based on participatory mechanisms involving not 
only those who have rights over the assets placed in the trust, but also other 
stakeholders. 
An essential element in the creation of  a CLT is the ownership of  land by the non-
profit organisation. The position of  the CLT in relation to the land it owns is, generally, 
that of  trustee, who must administer it for the purposes of  the trust and in the sole 
 
31 On the community land trust from an historical, legal and political perspective, see: K. WHITE, (eds), The CLT Technical 
Manual, Portland, 2011; M. TOWEY, The Land Trust Without Land: the Unusual Structure of the Chicago Community Land Trust, in 
Journal of Affordable Housing and Community Development Law, 2009; E. THADEN, Results of the 2011 Comprehensive 
CLT Survey, CLT-Network Papers, 2011; S.I. STEIN, Wake up Fannie, I Think I Got Something to Say to You: Financing Community 
Land Trusts without Stripping Affordability Provisions, in, 60, Emory Law Journal, 2010; C.A. SEEGER., The Fixed-Price Pre-emptive 
Right in the Community Land Trust Lease: a Valid Response to the Housing Crisis or an Invalid Restraint on Alienation?, in Cardozo Law 
Review, 11, 1989; S.T. PASTEL, Community Land Trusts: a Promising Alternative for Affordable Housing, in Journal of Land Use 
and Environmental Law, 6, 1991; J. MEHAN, Reinventing Real Estate: the Community Land Trust as a Social Invention in Affordable 
Housing, in Journal of Applied Social Science, 8, 2, 2010; J.J. KELLY, Land Trusts that Conserve Communities, in Depaul Law Review, 
59, 2009; J. FARREL CURTIN  and  L. BOKARLSY, CLTs: a Growing Trend in Affordable Home Ownership, in Journal of 
Affordable Housing and Community Development Law, 17, 2008; J.E. DAVIS (eds.), The Community Land Trust Reader, 
Cambridge (MA), 2010; D. ABROMOWITZ, An Essay on Community Land Trusts: Towards Permanently Affordable Housing, in 
Mississipi Law Journal, 61, 1991; D. ABROMOWITZ, Community Land Trusts and Ground Leases, in Journal of Affordable 
Housing and Community Development Law, 1, 1992; J.E. DAVIS J.E., A. STOKES, Lands in Trust, Homes that Last. A 
Performance Evaluation of the Champlain Housing Trust, Champlain Housing Trust Papers, 2009. 
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interest of  its beneficiaries. These bonds can be either created by establishing an actual 
trust, and thus through a deed of  trust, or by relying on specific clauses contained in 
the bylaws and articles of  association of  the non-profit corporation. These acts impose 
a number of  further and more precise limitations on the CLT, the first of  which is a 
lien of  inalienability on the land held in trust. Similar to what happens in the 
foundation, here too the permanent subtraction of  the land from individual 
appropriation and from the dynamics of  the market, is combined with the advantage 
of  an instrument that removes the good from the possible mercantilist choices that 
could come from public administration, given the private nature of  the owner.  
If  the CLT retains ownership of  the land on a permanent basis, it will, functionally, sell 
the houses which stand on it. It is precisely this subjective dissociation of  the title of  
property (ownership of  the land/ownership of  the improvements) that allows that 
mechanism of  socialization of  land rent that is at the heart of  the model. Such a 
mechanism permits the CLT to generate resources to be invested in reducing the costs 
of  access to housing and in the redevelopment of  the area. In fact, the CLT, while 
retaining ownership of  the land, can legally intervene to shape the property interests 
on the improvements. 
The homeowners are in fact bound to the CLT by a ground lease. The ground lease 
not only legally allows the inhabitants of  the CLT to maintain their construction on 
the land  belonging to the CLT, but also establishes a series of  rights and obligations of  
the owners towards the trust, as well as certain limits on the exercise of  its property 
rights, which thus appear conformed in such a way as to reconcile – even in a diachronic 
way – the needs of  individuals with those of  the community. 
The ground lease provides, in the first place, that the homeowner cannot re-sell the 
improvement at any price, but at the fixed price resulting from the application of  the 
criteria contained in a specific clause (the so-called resale formula clause), and grants 
the CLT a purchase-option. The objective of  the formula is to divide the land rent 
among all the participants in the transaction (the dynamics of  which will be discussed 
shortly), allowing the seller to obtain, in addition to the capital, an adequate return on 
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their investment and, on the other hand, the buyer to buy the property at a price below 
the market value of  the good. 
The most common formula applied in the American CLTs provides that the lessees 
cannot sell the home at a price higher than the sum of the amount they paid to purchase 
it, revalued in line with inflation, and a fixed percentage (usually 25%) of the increase 
in value the estate had acquired between the purchase and the selling. 
Both elements of the equation deserve some clarification. 
As regards the first, it must be said that the price at which the seller bought the good 
was also below its market value. This is because if you go back through the chain of 
sales of a CLT-home, you always come to a first purchase in which the price had been 
reduced through the payment of a subsidy, usually public. Since all buyers in the chain 
are bound by the ground lease, and therefore to the resale formula, under normal 
macroeconomic conditions all purchases after the first one will be made at a price below 
the market value. 
The market value of the home is not, however, completely exempted from the 
equation, but is part of the calculation of its second term, that is, the appreciation 
acquired by the improvement over the time between the two sales. This variable, in 
fact, is obtained by subtracting the market value of the good at the time of the first 
purchase, revalued in line with inflation, from that estimated at the time of its sale. 
However, it should be noted that both these values, of course, are determined by 
deducting the value of the land from the market price of the property unitarily 
considered (land + improvement), since the seller has a fee simple interest only in the 
building while, as we have seen, with respect to the land they have a mere leasehold 
interest for a limited time (usually ninety-nine years, renewable). 
Of the plus-value thus identified, the seller is entitled to obtain only 25%, the remainder 
being distributed between the buyer and the CLT. The buyer is usually allocated 70%, 
in the form of a reduction in the purchase price, and the CLT the remaining 5%, which 
is used to cover the transaction management costs and, above all, is invested in the 
redevelopment of the area. 
An example may better clarify how the model works. 
 30 
Taking the inflation variable out of the picture, for simplicity's sake, let us take the case 
of a newly formed CLT, which has acquired ownership of an estate (land + home) with 
a market value of $120. 
In order to start its operations, the CLT obtains public funding for $20, an amount 
which is linked to the reduction in the price of the first sale. 
Having identified the prospective home-buyer (A), the organization, at time T1, decides 
to sell the house to her. Since, however, the CLT retains ownership of the land, the 
price of the sale will be determined by subtracting not only the public subsidy ($20) but 
also the value of the land (say, another $20) from the purchase price sustained by the 
CLT. The first sale will, therefore, take place at a price of $80, allowing A to access a 
home that, on the market, would have required a payment of $120. 
Let us assume, now, that A, at time T2, decides to resell the property, and that for this 
purpose a new low-income buyer, B, has been identified. 
In order to determine the resale price, it will first be necessary to establish any increase 
in the value acquired by the good between time T1 and time T2, and then subtract the 
relevant market prices, net of the value of the land. 
Let us suppose, at this point, that, at the moment of T2, the entire estate is valued, on 
the market, at $200, of which $170 is the value of the building and $30 is the value of 
the land. 
The plus-value acquired by the improvement alone, which is the subject of the 
transaction, will therefore be equivalent to $170-$100 =$70. 
We can, at this point, calculate the resale price to which A is bound. It is equal to $80 
(the first purchase price) + 25% of $70 (= $17.50) and, therefore, adding up to the total 
amount of $97.50. 
When the purchase option is exercised, A will then be obliged to sell the good to the 
CLT for a sum equal to $97.50. It will then be up to CLT to formally sell the 
improvement to B, for a price equal to the resale price + 5% of the plus-value (5% of 
$70 = $3.50) and, therefore, at $101. 
B will thus find himself in a situation similar to the one in which A found herself at that 
time, having bought, for $101, a property with a market value of $170, and having had 
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access to a housing solution that on the free market (where, usually, the land is sold 
together with the building) would have required a payment of $200. 
This logic is destined to reproduce itself endlessly, in a chain pattern.  
And so if, in turn, B wanted to sell the improvement, whose market value has 
meanwhile increased by another $50 (from $170 to $220), C could buy it for $116 ($101 
+ 30% of $50); then, D could access the property, which in the meantime has 
appreciated by another $30, for the price of $130, instead of $250... and so on. 
In this way, a virtuous circle is created, permitting the CLT to permanently subtract 
the properties from the speculation of  the real estate market and which fosters, in the 
wake of  a single initial investment which surplus value is constantly distributed, a 
system of  permanent affordable housing (lock-in effect of  the initial investment). 
The ground lease then imposes on the inhabitants of  the CLT obligations relating to 
the ordinary maintenance of  the building and the care of  the surrounding space. 
Further clauses are also designed to curb absentee ownership and to hinder the use of  
market mechanisms that could distort the ultimate purpose of  the institution. From this 
last point of  view, the contractual practice reveals a tendency of  the ground leases to 
set rules that commit the owner to inhabit the property personally, in a constant and 
stable way, and provide binding limits to the lease of  the property in favour of  third 
parties. 
The legal structure of  the CLT allows it to enjoy a certain economic and financial 
stability. Firstly, by appropriating part of  the plus-value produced by each re-sale, the 
CLT can keep its equity stable. In addition, the ground lease requires the homeowners 
to pay the organization a fee, commensurate with the income and economic capacity 
of  each inhabitant, thus ensuring the entity a concrete financial autonomy. 
It is for the articles of  association to determine, in general terms, how the CLT's 
economic resources are to be allocated and the decision-making procedures to be 
followed to support the investments. In any case, the distribution of  profits is excluded. 
Any revenues shall thus be invested in the pursuit of  the institutional purposes of  the 
entity. In the traditional model, the CLT employs its revenues in two different ways.  
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First of  all, resources are invested in the extraordinary maintenance of  all 
improvements as well as in the (ordinary and extraordinary) maintenance of  CLT 
spaces that are not subject to individual use.  However, the largest proportion of  the 
CLT's revenues are generally allocated for development plans of  the area: renovation 
of  buildings for public use, redevelopment of  green areas, cultural initiatives, the 
construction and management of  social gathering places (theatres, small sports fields, 
etc.).  
In general, it is up to the CLT to determine which spaces should remain open to all 
and which, on the other hand, should be allocated for residential purposes. With 
regards to the former, access must be guaranteed to everyone, in accordance with the 
usage restrictions established by the trust, and can never be limited to CLT members 
only. It is also up to the trust, according to the criteria set by the bylaws, to determine 
whether and to what extent some properties can be rented to other private actors, so 
that they can establish productive, recreational and commercial activities. There are 
examples of  CLTs which, for instance, host urban gardens, youth hostels, workshops, 
co-working offices and cultural spaces which are managed by associations, cooperatives 
etc., all linked to the trust by a contract of  lease. Moreover, while the contract binds the 
lessee to respect the values and fundamental principles of  the CLT, it generally also 
fixes the rent at current prices, given the essentially commercial nature of  the activities 
carried out.  
In the CLT's traditional model, the governance of  the territory is therefore 
accompanied by the need to respond to the housing crisis, as a further element that 
qualifies the model. This is a participatory and open form of  governance, guaranteed 
by precise institutional mechanisms. The first consists of  the open membership which 
characterizes the non-profit entity that supervises the CLT.  
In fact, anyone (and not only the homeowners) can become a member, as it is sufficient 
to share the values, ideals and scope of  the organization. 
The CLT's homeowners, those who participate in the cultural initiatives it promotes, 
those who run their own business on the common land, citizens of  the surrounding 
districts, etc., can all be members of  the CLT, all linked by the common interest in and 
 33 
commitment to the care and collective enjoyment of  the spaces. In most CLTs, 
membership gives the right to vote in the assembly, which is the highest decision-making 
body of  the organisation. Decisions are taken by a board of  directors with a tripartite 
structure: it is composed, in equal measure, of  representatives of  the homeowners, 
representatives of  the public interest and representatives of  the inhabitants of  the 
surrounding areas. The organs of  the CLT adopt, in a democratic manner and 
following the procedures provided for by the organisation's bylaws, all decisions relating 
to the governance of  the territory: use of  space, investments, usage restrictions, cultural 
initiatives, etc32. 
In light of  this, it is therefore clear that the CLT cannot be regarded as just a system of  
social housing, one of  the many solutions developed to stem the shelter emergency. It 
represents an articulated paradigm, which opposes the extractive logic of  traditional 
(private and public) tools of  urban governance, a generative and sustainable ownership 
regime. 
The success of  the model in ensuring, thanks to the lock-in effect, perpetual affordable 
housing with fewer resources than any public social housing programme and in 
promoting a territorial redevelopment able to stem the pressures of  gentrification, has 
contributed to its widespread diffusion. 
This diffusion has not been limited to the United States. The CLT has been 
transplanted into many other jurisdictions, where activists, public administrations and 
local housing organizations have relied on their domestic law to recreate the model.   
It is interesting to note that this phenomenon of  legal transplant "from the bottom up" 
has not remained confined to common law jurisdictions (such as the United Kingdom, 
Australia or Canada, all countries where the institution of  the CLT is quite widespread) 
33. Important experiences of  CLT have now also taken place in civil law countries: the 
 
32 The idea of an interconnection between object and subject within the theory of ownership, of which the CLT is a clear 
example, was firstly theorized, within the Italian legal scholarship, by S. PUGLIATTI, La proprietà e le proprietà con riguardo 
particolare alla proprietà terriera, in ID., La proprietà nel nuovo diritto, Milano, 1964. On this point, also with reference to the CLT, 
see A. DI ROBILANT Property and Democratic Deliberation: The Numerus Clausus Principle and Democratic Experimentalism in Property 
Law, in American Journal of Comparative Law, 62, 2, 2014. 
33 On the Australian experience see:  The Australian Community Land Trust Manual, Sydney, 2013; with regards to the UK 
cf. K. WHITE (ed.), The Community Land Trust Handbook, London, 2013. 
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most relevant example, in this sense, is the CLT of  the city of  Brussels, commonly 
considered as one of  the most relevant best-practice of  participatory social housing in 
the EU34. 
Although no CLT has yet been established in Italy, the model has been much debated 
as a paradigm for the management of  urban commons, and some municipal 
regulations mention the institution as a possible model of  governance. In a manner not 
too dissimilar to what is happening in Belgium, the CLT can be translated into Italian 
law, where results similar to those pursued in the US can be obtained by coordinating 
a foundation together with the establishment of  a diritto di superficie (a sort of  a ground 
lease) 35. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
The theory of  the commons, and in particular, its declination in the Italian experience, 
allows one to draw some theoretical conclusions. 
The first concerns something that we have already partially mentioned: namely the 
ascertaining of  how, in Italy, the debate on the commons has dragged the category out 
of  the difficulties into which economic theory had forced it. Expanding the strict 
economic notion, according to which common goods correspond to goods which bear 
certain specific characteristics (subtractability and non-excludability), the Italian legal 
scholarship has instead loaded them with a markedly political connotation, identifying 
the key feature of  the commons in the process of  commoning36. It is a political 
component which directly implicates the law and which, in this way, reveals the illusion 
(all internal to legal positivism) of  the separation between the political dimension and 
the "neutral and technical" domain of  legal institutions. 
 
34 On the community land trust in Belgium, with specific reference to the experience of Brussels, cf. N. BERNARD, G. DE 
PAW, L. GERONNEZ, Le Community Land Trust, solution pour concilier l’accessibilité du logement, les advantge de la propriété et un foncier 
au service de l’intérêt général, in Les cahiers nouveaux, 78, 2011; N. BERNARD, G. DE PAW, L. GERONNEZ Cooperative de logement 
et Community Land, in Courrier hebdomadaire, 2010; N. BERNARD, L’emphytéose et la superficie comme pistes de solution à la crise 
du logement, in Les échos du logement, 1, 2010. 
35 A. VERCELLONE, Il Community Land Trust, op. cit., especially the last chapter.  
36 Cf. P. DARDOT, C. LAVAL, Commun. Essai sur la revolution au XXI siecle, Paris, 2012. 
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The consequence of  this is that, and this is a second important aspect, the notion of  
the commons in Italy, far from qualifying specific goods due to their intrinsic 
characteristics, is rather a hermeneutical picklock to identify experiences of  political 
practice and to develop, based on them, innovative legal solutions through a counter-
hegemonic use of  existing law. 
The commons thus describe situations in which, in the face of  the shortfalls of  both the 
state and the market in satisfying the needs of  individuals and communities (needs 
which, from the legal point of  view, translate into an equivalent number of  fundamental 
rights) see formal and informal communities organizing themselves to provide welfare 
solutions from the bottom-up, through cooperation. 
It is not by chance that, in the social and legal practice of  the commons, the state does 
not relate to communities according to a top-down approach but adopts, instead, 
institutionalized models of  a cooperative nature. In other words, the commons reveal 
how the state is not the only body responsible for providing answers for collective needs 
and fundamental rights, but how these can find a solution directly through social 
cooperation. In the latter case, the state (and its territorial articulations) can certainly 
play a role (even an important one), but it is a role in which the state cooperates, in a 
horizontal relationship, with the communities of  reference. This is, in other words, a 
context that sees a marked enhancement of  the principle of  horizontal subsidiarity, a 
principle which, as mentioned, the Italian Constitution expressly provides for in its 
Article 118.  
The second, and perhaps most important, element that emerged from our analysis 
concerns private law. 
Indeed, the commons reveal how private law can be used as a tool against privatisation 
and how, in certain circumstances, it can guarantee access to collective goods and their 
participatory management more successfully than traditional forms of  public 
ownership. What has been said about the foundation and the trust is, in this sense, of  
paradigmatic example. 
This only appears paradoxical.  
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Indeed, the legal tools we have examined (rectius: the use of  these tools as instruments 
of  governance for the commons) show how the asymmetry of  protection between 
public and private ownership, which was mentioned at the beginning of  this article, 
can be exploited for a strategic purpose, an opposite purpose to the rationale that inspired 
this asymmetry within post-revolutionary European constitutionalism. In other words, 
at the origin of  modern constitutionalism, the strong protection of  private property was 
justified by the need to guarantee the market before the intrusive needs of  the 
"collective", embodied by the state. Our analysis has shown how, in an historical 
moment where we are facing the opposite needs, we can strategically rely on the legal 
protection the system grants to private property to conceptually overturn it as a means 
to guarantee access and participation in the management of  important collective goods. 
The assignation of  a public good to a foundation or a community land trust marks, 
after all, the possibility to resort to privatisation to fight privatisation or, to phrase it 
better, the possibility to transfer goods from public to private-law entities in order to 
prevent them from becoming the subject of  market exchanges. 
This is particularly interesting, since it shows another “face” of  private law. From the 
branch of  the law that organizes the market, setting forth its institutional premises (i.e. 
property and contract), private law can become the space within which the 
communities organize themselves and, resorting to contractual autonomy37, create 
property regimes capable of  streamlining the utility obtainable from a good not for 
market exchanges but for the fulfilment of  fundamental rights38. 
This conclusion is particularly interesting if  compared to the narrative typical of  the 
classic theory of  ownership. Private property is, in fact, traditionally described as that 
institution which, by assigning all the prerogatives of  use and disposal of  a good to one 
person, allowing this latter to exclude all the others, promotes the maximum extractive 
use of  resources39. 
 
37 See W. C. SFORZA, Il diritto dei privati, (second edition), Macerata, 2018, with an essay by Michele Spanò. 
38 See A. QUARTA and U. MATTEI, The Turning Point in Private Law. Ecology, Technology and the Commons, Cheltenham, 2018; 
M. Spanò, Making the Multiple: Towards a Trans-Subjective Private Law, in The South Atlantic Quarterly, 4, 2019, p. 839. 
39 This is a point very much debated in the field of law and economics. Also with reference to the commons, see: G. 
HARDIN, The Tragedy of the Commons cit.; H. DEMSETZ, Towards a Theory of Property Rights, in 57, Am. Econ. Rev., 1967 pp. 
347 ss.; ID. A., Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: the Competition between Private and Collective Ownership, in 31 Journal of Legal 
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The theory and the praxis of  the commons show, however, how, under existing law, it 
is possible to create, from the bottom-up, ownership regimes that overturn this 
perspective. Think, in that regard, of  the community land trust. It ultimately amounts 
to a form of  ownership which places access, rather than exclusion, at its heart. A form 
of  ownership that allocates the goods and the utilities they produce not according to 
the criterion of  supply and demand but on the basis of  individual (access to housing) 
and collective (urban regeneration) needs, needs which correspond to an equivalent 
number of  fundamental rights. It is a model of  ownership which, instead of  fostering 
the maximum exploitation of  resources and the allocation of  their value to one single 
subject, allows the constant distribution of  land rent. 
This is perhaps the most important aspect of  the commons. That is to say, to show how 
it is possible to combine extractive ownership, namely that form of  ownership handed 
down to us by tradition and of  which the nineteenth century codes still speak today, 
with forms of  generative ownership40. These are forms of  ownership which, 
overcoming the now obsolete dichotomy of  private property (market) and public 
intervention (state), set out property arrangements directly streamlined for 
redistribution and, above all, for the satisfaction of  fundamental rights, which privilege 
access over exclusion and value in use over value of  exchange, also in the interests of  
future generations41. 
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